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Implicit motives like the need for power (nPower) scale affective responses to
need-specific rewards or punishments and thereby influence activity in motivational-brain
structures. In this paper, we review evidence specifically supporting a role of the striatum
in nPower. Individual differences in nPower predict (1) enhanced implicit learning accuracy,
but not speed, on serial-response tasks that are reinforced by power-related incentives
(e.g., winning or losing a contest; dominant or submissive emotional expressions) in
behavioral studies and (2) activation of the anterior caudate in response to dominant
emotional expressions in brain imaging research. We interpret these findings on the basis
of Hikosaka et al.’s (2002a) model of central mechanisms of motor skill learning. The model
assigns a critical role to the dorsoanterior striatum in dopamine-driven learning of spatial
stimulus sequences. Based on this model, we suggest that the dorsoanterior striatum
is the locus of nPower-dependent reinforcement. However, given the centrality of this
structure in a wide range of motivational pursuits, we also propose that activity in the
dorsoanterior striatum may not only reflect individual differences in nPower, but also in
other implicit motives, like the need for achievement or the need for affiliation, provided
that the proper incentives for these motives are present during reinforcement learning.
We discuss evidence in support of such a general role of the dorsoanterior striatum in
implicit motivation.
Keywords: implicit motives, personality, reinforcement, learning, dopamine, power motivation, striatum, caudate
nucleus
Implicit motives represent enduring non-conscious, affect-based
preferences that drive humans’ behavior toward the attain-
ment of certain types of incentives, such as those related
to power/dominance, social affiliation, attachment, achieve-
ment/mastery, food, or sex that are fundamental for survival in
the social and non-social world (Schultheiss and Wirth, 2008;
Schultheiss and Brunstein, 2010). The need for power (nPower)
is an implicit motivational disposition to experience one’s own
impact on others as rewarding and others’ impact on oneself as
aversive (Winter, 1973; Schultheiss, 2008). Research has accumu-
lated evidence for a critical role of this need in implicit learning
of behavior that is instrumental for obtaining rewards and avoid-
ing punishers in the power domain. Other research suggests an
involvement of the dorsoanterior striatum in nPower-associated
responses to power incentives. In the present paper, we first briefly
review these two lines of research and then integrate them into a
model of nPower-dependent individual differences in instrumen-
tal learning mediated by the dorsoanterior striatum. In closing,
we will discuss the role of the striatum in the context of other
motivational needs.
nPOWER: MEASUREMENT AND VALIDITY
AS A MOTIVATIONAL NEED DISPOSITION
Measures of nPower were developed and successively fine-
honed through studies in which researchers studied effects of
experimentally aroused power motivation on the content of
imaginative stories that research participants wrote about pic-
ture cues (Veroff, 1957; Uleman, 1972; Winter, 1973). In this
way, content-coding systems for nPower were derived that have
causal validity (see Borsboom et al., 2004) and that capture the
themes that power-motivated people spontaneously think about
and inject into picture stories. Story themes related to nPower
can be objectively coded from picture stories, as documented by
inter-rater reliabilities of typically >0.85 (Schultheiss and Pang,
2007). nPower scores derived from content-coding have good
retest reliability (Schultheiss and Pang, 2007) and are particu-
larly suitable for predicting spontaneous behavior in response to
non-verbal incentives, long-term behavioral trends, and health
outcomes such as immune system functioning and cardiovascu-
lar disease (McClelland, 1989; Schultheiss, 2008; Fodor, 2010).
Notably, nPower is considered to be an implicit motive, because
content-coded nPower does not generally correlate with ques-
tionnaire measures of self-attributed (i.e., explicit) power motiva-
tion, dominance, or aggression (e.g., Pang and Schultheiss, 2005;
Stanton and Schultheiss, 2007), and neither do these explicit
measures account for the motivational outcomes and phenom-
ena that nPower predicts (for reviews of the differences between
implicit and explicit motive measures, see McClelland et al., 1989;
Schultheiss, 2008; Stanton et al., 2010).
Like other implicit motives (e.g., the needs for achievement,
affiliation, or intimacy), nPower determines the degree to which
a person finds pleasure in, or likes (cf. Berridge, 2003), a particular
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class of rewards, which, in the case of nPower, consist of episodes
in which the person has impact on others or dominates others.
It also determines the degree to which a person experiences as
aversive, or dislikes, a particular class of punishments, such as
failing to have impact on others or being the object of others’
dominance. Individual differences in nPower thus correspond to
individual differences in the reward and punishment value of such
episodes and, as a consequence, in the intensity and frequency
with which a person strives for them or wants them in the case
of power-specific rewards or wants to avoid them in the case of
power-specific punishments.
Evidence for differential pleasure responses to dominance suc-
cess or failure come from studies using objective indicators of
affect as represented in facial expressions. Assessing activity of the
corrugator muscle, which is involved in frowning and assumed
to reflect hedonic responses to objects and events (Larsen et al.,
2003), Fodor and colleagues have demonstrated that individu-
als high in nPower respond with increased corrugator activation
when confronted with dominant others and with decreased acti-
vation when dealing with non-dominant interaction partners
(Fodor et al., 2006, 2012; Fodor and Wick, 2009). Other studies
have used subjective ratings of hedonic well-being to show that
nPower predicts individuals’ emotional well-being in response
to success and failure in the everyday pursuit of power goals
(Brunstein et al., 1998; Schultheiss et al., 2008a).
Research on autonomic responses to power incentives shows
that nPower predicts distinct hormonal release patterns to dom-
inance and defeat. Men high in nPower respond to a vic-
tory in a one-on-one competition against another man with
an increase in testosterone, whereas they respond to a defeat
with a decrease in this hormone (Schultheiss and Rohde, 2002;
Schultheiss et al., 2005b). Women high in nPower show a par-
allel response pattern to victory and defeat in their estradiol
levels (Stanton and Schultheiss, 2007). Power-motivated men and
women both respond with increased adrenal catecholamines to
power-arousing situations (McClelland et al., 1980, 1985) and
with increased cortisol to defeat in such situations (Wirth et al.,
2006). These studies suggest that the hypothalamus, a key inter-
face between motivation, endocrine regulation, and behavior
(Iversen et al., 2000), is involved in nPower (see Schultheiss, 2013,
for a review) and that nPower thus has many of the hallmarks of
power/dominance motivation as studied by biopsychologists and
neuroscientists (e.g., Sapolsky, 1987; Albert et al., 1992; Johnson
et al., 2012).
More evidence that nPower is associated with core motiva-
tional processes comes from a brain imaging study in which
Schultheiss et al. (2008b) used an oddball detection task to test
effects of facial expressions of emotion (FEE) on activation of
brain areas that are critically involved in motivational regulation
of behavior (striatum, amygdala, insula, orbitofrontal cortex).
This work was based on the notion that FEEs represent inter-
personal incentives whose reward and punishment value depends
both on the emotion displayed by the sender and the motivational
needs of the perceiver (Stanton et al., 2010). More specifically,
Schultheiss et al. (2008b) expected that for high-power indi-
viduals, but not for low-power individuals, angry expressions
signal high dominance and thus represent an aversive stimulus
and that surprised expressions signal low dominance and thus
represent a rewarding stimulus. Except for the amygdala, in which
the signal was in the expected direction but too weak to pass
a stringent significance threshold (see Hall et al., 2010), indi-
vidual variations of nPower predicted enhanced brain activation
responses in all motivational-brain areas to angry expressions, rel-
ative to neutral expressions, and to a lesser extent also to surprised
expressions. Notably, nPower-dependent activation increases to
dominance-related FEEs were strong and extensive in the dor-
soanterior striatum, particularly the caudate head, a key structure
for reinforcement learning (Delgado, 2007). This observation
plays a key role in our explanation of phenomena associated
with nPower-dependent implicit learning, an issue to which we
turn next.
nPOWER-DEPENDENT IMPLICIT LEARNING
Implicit learning occurs when a person picks up a regularity in the
patterning of environmental cues and uses it to increase response
efficiency, above and beyond performance changes unrelated to
learning and without being able to explicitly state the regular-
ity (Reber, 1989; Berry, 1996). Although implicit learning is a
phenomenon usually studied from the perspective of cognitive
psychology, some researchers have extended its range of valid-
ity to the social domain (e.g., Lewicki et al., 1989). Lieberman
(2000) in particular argued that implicit learning is the basis of
social intuition, that is, complex, yet largely automatic behavioral
adjustments in response to social feedback that individuals need
to make to succeed in their interactions with others.
This social-adjustment view of implicit learning also guided
a series of studies we and our collaborators conducted on
nPower-moderated responses to dominance contest outcomes.
The research was based on the hypothesis that because individ-
ual differences in nPower determine to what extent dominating
another person is rewarding or being dominated by another per-
son is aversive, implicit learning of behavior that results in these
situational outcomes should likewise depend on individual differ-
ences in nPower. For instance, because a person high in nPower
can enjoy beating an opponent in a direct competition, this per-
son should also better learn whatever he or she has done during
the competition to be victorious. In contrast, a person low in
nPower should not enjoy a victory against a competitor and there-
fore also fail to get reinforced for whatever behavior has led to this
outcome.
We have tested this hypothesis in a series of studies that com-
bined a dominance-contest paradigm, in which the outcome
(victory, defeat) was experimentally manipulated, with implicit-
learning tasks that participants worked on during the contest.
In all studies, gains in implicit learning were assessed after the
contest, or, in the parlance of learning psychology, during extinc-
tion, when reinforcement (beating the opponent; being beaten
by the opponent) was no longer provided. In all studies, explicit
awareness of learning was assessed at the end of data collec-
tion, and participants generally had no declarative knowledge
of the stimulus-response pattern they had learned. Moreover,
when those few participants who showed explicit knowledge of
the pattern were excluded from analyses, the results reported
in the following remained unchanged, suggesting that explicit
awareness of the pattern was not critical for its acquisition and
execution.
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Using a paper-and-pencil task that allowed participants to
learn a repeating pattern of connections between successive num-
bers, Schultheiss and Rohde (2002) found in a study with male
German participants that nPower significantly predicted better
learning among contest winners, and worse learning among con-
test losers, who were also low in activity inhibition, a measure
of brain lateralization during stress (Schultheiss et al., 2009).
Schiepe-Tiska (2012), who used a computer-administered vari-
ant of Nissen and Bullemer’s (1987) serial-response-task (SRT)
paradigm for the assessment of implicit learning in a similar
contest paradigm, recently replicated these results in another
study withmale German participants. Like Schultheiss and Rohde
(2002), Schiepe-Tiska found a joint effect of nPower and con-
test outcome on implicit learning among participants low in
activity inhibition, with nPower predicting better learning among
winners, but not among losers.
These findings were replicated and extended to both genders
by Schultheiss et al. (2005b) in two studies with US students
using the SRT paradigm for the assessment of implicit learn-
ing. In these studies, nPower predicted better learning among
winners and worse learning among losers in men and women
alike and regardless of participants’ activity inhibition levels. The
findings reported by Schultheiss and Rohde (2002), Schiepe-
Tiska (2012), and Schultheiss et al. (2005b) are all consis-
tent with the notion that winners should learn and utilize the
fixed sequence inherent in implicit learning tasks only to the
extent that they experience the outcome as rewarding (victory)
or punishing (defeat), which in turn depends on participants’
nPower.
Going beyond the dominance-contest paradigm, Schultheiss
et al. (2005a) tested whether individual differences in nPower
also predict implicit learning when the action-contingent out-
come is the presentation of an FEE. Like Schultheiss et al. (2008b),
these authors argued that facial expressions of anger, joy, surprise,
and neutrality can be aligned on a dominance dimension, with
anger and joy signaling someone else’s high dominance and thus
being aversive for a power-motivated perceiver, surprise signal-
ing someone else’s low dominance, and thus being rewarding for
a power-motivated perceiver, and neutrality representing a mid-
point on the dominance dimension. Schultheiss et al. (2005a)
tested the validity of this proposition by having each of their par-
ticipants learn three distinct SRT sequences. One sequence was
always followed by an emotional face, one always by a neutral
face, and one always by no reinforcing stimulus. Emotion (anger,
surprise, joy) was varied between subjects. Learning was tested
in extinction, that is, when SRT fixed-sequence execution was
no longer reinforced by faces. Results showed that compared to
learning on neutral-face or no-face sequences, nPower predicted
enhanced learning of surprise-face SRT sequences and impaired
learning of joy-face sequences. For participants in the angry-face
condition, nPower predicted impaired implicit learning overall.
These findings suggest that, as proposed by Lieberman (2000),
implicit learning is indeed sensitive to social signals such as brief
emotional expressions. But like the contest studies, it shows that
the meaning of social dominance signals and dominance-related
outcomes as hedonically charged rewards and punishers depends
on individuals’ nPower.
One surprising but very consistent finding in the studies
using the SRT paradigm by Schultheiss et al. (2005a,b) and
Schiepe-Tiska (2012) was that the effect of nPower on learning
emerged for the accuracy with which participants executed the
fixed sequence (relative to random sequences), but not for a more
commonly used indicator of implicit learning, that is, the relative
speed with which participants executed the fixed sequence. (The
task used by Schultheiss and Rohde, 2002, did not allow to dif-
ferentiate between accuracy and speed effects.) Effects of nPower
on speed-based learning emerged only in the FEE-reinforcement
study by Schultheiss et al. (2005a). However, these effects were
considerably weaker and more dependent on additional factors
(e.g., FEE presentation time) than the effects observed for accu-
racy. Across all studies, the specificity of the effect of nPower
on learning accuracy was particularly striking because speed-
and accuracy-based indicators of learning were positively cor-
related (up to r = 0.50). How can the differential sensitivity
of implicit-learning accuracy and speed for nPower-dependent
reinforcement be explained?
A STRIATAL BASIS OF nPOWER-DEPENDENT IMPLICIT
LEARNING
We propose that insights from more than a decade of research
on the role of the dorsoanterior striatum in early sequence learn-
ing, action-outcome learning, and the modulation of learning by
dopamine (DA) input to the striatum may help answer this ques-
tion. Using a serial-response task that could be adapted for use
with both primates and human research participants, Hikosaka
and colleagues demonstrated, by transient blockade of learn-
ing through transmitter antagonists (Miyachi et al., 1997) and
by augmentation of learning through electrical stimulation of
neuron populations (Nakamura and Hikosaka, 2006; see also
Williams and Eskandar, 2006), that the anterior portion of the
caudate nucleus is critically involved in the implicit learning of
new visuomotor sequences, and that such learning is reflected by an
increase in sequence execution accuracy. In contrast, experimen-
tal manipulation of neuronal activity in more posterior parts of
the striatum specifically altered the performance of well-learned
sequences and was reflected in changes in sequence execution
speed (Miyachi et al., 1997, 2002).
Applied to the previously reviewed findings relating nPower
and implicit learning accuracy, this suggests that nPower-
dependent modulation of instrumental learning occurs early,
during the acquisition of action-outcome contingencies, and is
mediated by the dorsoanterior striatum. Such an interpretation
would be consistent with the observation of nPower-dependent
activation of the caudate head in response to perceived domi-
nance signals (Schultheiss et al., 2008b; Hall et al., 2010), which
may have reflected a process related to the recruitment of suit-
able responses for dealing with the emotional stimulus. It would
also be consistent with a hypothesis presented by Hikosaka and
colleagues (Hikosaka et al., 1999; Balleine et al., 2007; see also
Balleine and O’Doherty, 2010), who have argued that the acquisi-
tion of stimulus-guided behavioral sequences in the dorsoanterior
striatum, and particularly the head of the caudate, is a form of
action-outcome contingency learning that depends on the moti-
vational value of the outcome at the time of acquisition: the
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higher the reward value of the outcome, the steeper the learn-
ing (see, for instance, Delgado et al., 2003). Moreover, Balleine
et al. (2007) point out that action-outcome learning mediated by
the dorsoanterior striatum is particularly likely to be observed in
tasks that have a strong social-interaction component, such as
punishing others for transgressing a social norm (de Quervain
et al., 2004) or learning to trust another person in an economic
exchange (King-Casas et al., 2005). This, too, fits the studies on
nPower and learning, which featured “strong” social interactions
by using actual face-to-face contest situations to make victory
and defeat salient (Schultheiss and Rohde, 2002; Schultheiss et al.,
2005b; Schiepe-Tiska, 2012).
Our interpretation of nPower-dependent implicit learning also
fits well with Lieberman’s (2000) neurocognitive model of social
intuition. Like Balleine et al. (2007), Lieberman (2000) argues
that intuition based on implicit learning of socially adaptive
behavior depends critically on the striatum—effective and sophis-
ticated adaptation of social behavior is possible only to the extent
that an intact striatum supports implicit learning processes.
Frequently, power-motivated individuals are socially successful
not because they try to have impact on others through blunt dom-
inance and aggression—a strategy that is prone to backfire—but
by picking up on “behaviors that work,” such as appearing com-
petent and intelligent to others (Schultheiss and Brunstein, 2002),
being perceived as charismatic (De Hoogh et al., 2005), or even
learning to execute an arbitrary sequence of key presses, as in
our contest studies. We argue that the diverse range of sophisti-
cated behaviors that power-motivated individuals learn to employ
in their quest for impact depend on striatum-mediated implicit
learning that gives rise to such intuitive and successful behavioral
strategies. Following Lieberman’s (2000) lead, we would therefore
predict that a loss of a functional dorsoanterior striatum would
equal a loss of sophisticated pursuit of power-related incentives
in power-motivated individuals. This is illustrated by a case study
of a young woman with bilateral damage of the caudate head,
reported by Richfield et al. (1987). Before the damage, the woman
had graduated from high school with high honors, held a job, and
was happily engaged. Although the woman did not complete a
measure on nPower, one can surmise that she expressed what-
ever degree of nPower she had in well-adjusted ways. After the
damage, however, her behavior became socially inappropriate and
included vulgarity and violent outbursts, which can be recognized
as the prototypical, unsocialized forms of power seeking typically
observed in young children (see McClelland and Pilon, 1983).
Learning of stimulus-response contingencies in the striatum
depends on the release of DA by projections of cells located
in the brainstem (substantia nigra [SN] and ventral tegmental
area [VTA]). Animal and human studies of implicit sequence
learning1 show that experimental enhancement and inhibi-
tion of DA release lead to corresponding enhancements and
1By necessity, sequence learning tasks in animal studies—particularly when
rats or mice are used—often differ from those used in human studies.
However, because researchers aim to model the animal tasks on the human
tasks, they also share key features, such as the association of motor responses
with spatially patterned stimuli (e.g., Dunnett et al., 2012). Moreover, when
primates are compared to humans, it is even possible to use the same sequence
learning tasks (e.g., Hikosaka et al., 2002b).
impairments of sequence learning (Kumari et al., 1997; Miyachi
et al., 1997; Dunnett et al., 2012; for a review, see Udden et al.,
2010). Moreover, human research participants show increased
DA release in the striatum, including the caudate head, during
implicit learning on the SRT (Badgaiyan et al., 2007). Individuals
suffering from Parkinson’s disease, which is associated with
reduced DA levels, show worse implicit sequence learning perfor-
mance than healthy control participants (Smith and McDowall,
2004). While these studies suggest that the availability of DA
at the synapse is a critical requirement for implicit learning to
occur, other research, reviewed in Bromberg-Martin et al. (2010),
shows more specifically that phasic bursts of DA in the striatum
drive action-outcome learning, depending on the motivational
value of the outcome generated by the response. Some DA neu-
rons code for the rewarding consequences of an action, marking
the event with a brief increase (i.e., spike) of DA release at stri-
atal synapses, whereas other DA neurons code for punishment,
as reflected by a brief reduction (i.e., trough) of DA at striatal
synapses (Matsumoto and Hikosaka, 2009). If the outcome has
no positive or negative motivational value, DA release is neither
increased nor reduced. Thus, at the synaptic level, phasic DA
changes reinforce action-outcome learning in the case of reward
or suppress it in the case of punishment (see Bromberg-Martin
et al., 2010). We suggest that in the context of power-relevant
person-environment transactions, nPower determines the magni-
tude of phasic DA release changes in response to action outcomes,
because it determines the motivational value of success or fail-
ure at having impact on others. Thus, in the dominance contest
studies reviewed above, we would have expected high-power indi-
viduals, but not low-power individuals, to show marked DA
spikes in the dorsoanterior striatum in response to winning a
round on a dominance contest. These DA spikes could in turn
have reinforced the stimulus-response contingencies inherent in
the implicit visuomotor learning task the contest was based on.
Conversely, we would have expected high-power individuals, but
not low-power individuals, to show marked DA troughs in the
dorsoanterior striatum in response to losing a round. These DA
troughs could in turn have suppressed the acquisition of stimulus-
response contingencies in the learning task (see Figure 1). We
propose that this represents the neurophysiological mechanism
by which nPower, in interaction with dominance-related rewards
and punishments, drives implicit learning in power-relevant situ-
ational contexts.2
A BROADER PERSPECTIVE ON THE ROLE OF THE
DORSOANTERIOR STRIATUM IN IMPLICIT MOTIVATION
In closing, we want to briefly address the question of where in
the brain nPower-associated motivational valuation of an action
outcome is encoded and also discuss the broader implications
2Other brain areas, such as the amygdala, contribute to emotional processing
in general (e.g., Sergerie et al., 2008) and instrumental learning in particular
(e.g., Killcross et al., 1997), and DA projections to the amygdala are known to
influence emotional-motivational processing (for an overview, see for instance
Cardinal et al., 2002). While we think that a broader network of brain areas
including the amygdala and other structures is involved in implicit power
motivation (see Figure 1; see also Schultheiss et al., 2008b; Hall et al., 2010),
we focus selectively on the role of the striatum in nPower-dependent implicit
learning in the present paper.
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FIGURE 1 | Overview of the structures, pathways, and processes
postulated to mediate nPower effects on implicit learning. Learning of
new stimulus-response (S-R) sequences takes place in the head of the
caudate nucleus and is reflected in the accuracy with which S-R sequences
are executed (Hikosaka et al., 1999). The motivational value of the outcome
of such S-R sequences is encoded by phasic DA release, with a transient
spike in DA cell firing marking a reward and leading to reinforcement of the
sequence and a transient trough marking a punishment and leading to a
suppression of the sequence (see Bromberg-Martin et al., 2010). We
propose that in dominance-related contexts, the magnitude of the phasic
DA changes that drive S-R learning in the caudate depends on
nPower-associated liking of power-specific rewards and disliking of
power-specific punishers, with higher nPower leading to greater DA
changes in response to such events. We furthermore propose that
nPower-dependent scaling of (dis)liking responses to power-specific
(dis)incentives takes place in need-specific areas (shaded gray circles) of
the hypothalamus and in reward- and punishment-related hedonic
evaluation areas of the orbitofrontal cortex (OFC; green represents the
medial reward-related areas, red the lateral punishment-related areas; see
Kringelbach, 2005), which closely interacts with the hypothalamus.
nPower-specific incentive evaluation in these areas can influence striatal
S-R learning by (A) hypothalamic modulation of DA release from the
substantia nigra/ventral tegmental area (SN/VTA), (B) direct projections
from the OFC to the head of the caudate, or (C) indirect modulation of
striatal DA release by the influence of nPower on gonadal steroids
(estradiol, testosterone), whose levels are regulated by the hypothalamus.
of the model for other implicit motivational needs. Although
we have argued that the magnitude of phasic changes in striatal
DA release in response to dominance incentives and disincen-
tives reflects nPower-dependent valuation of action outcomes, we
do not want to suggest that they represent nPower-dependent
neuronal representations of reward evaluation (i.e., liking) or
that all phasic variations in dopaminergic neurotransmission are
driven by nPower. For one, DA responses have been shown to
dissociate from liking responses to rewards and punishers and
to become associated with incentive-predicting cues over time
and with the monitoring of prediction accuracy (Schultz, 1998;
Bromberg-Martin et al., 2010). Moreover, DA release in the stria-
tum is involved in striving for many different types of incentives,
including food, sex, and money, and thus represents a com-
mon currency of motivational valuation, not a process specifically
linked to one motive, such as nPower. However, DA neurons in
the SN and VTA receive inputs from other brain areas that may
represent more specific motivational needs and need-specific out-
come evaluations and thus may drive DA release in the striatum
via their projections to the SN/VTA area. One brain site with
particularly extensive projections to this area is the hypothala-
mus (Gonzalez et al., 2012), which represents physiological and
social needs in a domain-specific manner in distinct nuclei (see
Schultheiss, 2013) and, as we have pointed out previously, is
involved in the nPower-associated release of testosterone in men
and estradiol in women. The hypothalamus may also transmit to
the SN/VTA domain-specific and topographically distinct hedo-
nic liking signals encoded by the orbitofrontal cortex (OFC; see
Kringelbach, 2005), with which it has extensive reciprocal con-
nections (Öngür and Price, 2000). Schultheiss et al. (2008b) and
Hall et al. (2010) have argued that these brain sites are partic-
ularly likely candidates for representing individual differences in
liking responses to motive-specific rewards and punishments, and
we suggest that these specific liking responses to power-related
rewards and punishments drive responses of DA neurons in the
SN/VTA.
It is also conceivable that nPower-specific outcome evaluations
influence striatal functions more directly by, for instance, direct
projections from the OFC to the dorsoanterior striatum (Öngür
and Price, 2000), which may modulate synaptic learning driven
by phasic DA changes in a specific manner, or by the effects of
nPower-associated testosterone and estradiol, which broadly aug-
ment striatal DA effects (e.g., Becker and Rudick, 1999; Frye et al.,
2002). The latter suggestion is consistent with the observation by
both Schultheiss and Rohde (2002) and Schultheiss et al. (2005b)
that in male contest winners and losers, effects of nPower on
implicit learning were mediated by changes in testosterone.
Both the notion that need-specific outcome evaluations take
place elsewhere in the brain and the fact that the striatum is
active during the pursuit of many different motivational incen-
tives suggest that the dorsoanterior striatum, and DA-based
learning happening there, may also play a role in other implicit
motives, such as the needs for achievement (nAchievement; Pang,
2010) and affiliation (nAffiliation; Weinberger et al., 2010). In
support of this notion, Bäumler (1975; reviewed in Schultheiss
and Brunstein, 2005) has shown that experimental pharmaco-
logical manipulation of DA levels effects changes in a measure
of nAchievement, with DA agonists leading to an increase and
DA antagonists leading to a decrease of achievement imagery in
the stories that research participants write about picture cues
related to achievement. Moreover, Hall et al. (2010) report that
nAchievement assessed with a picture-story test positively pre-
dicts activation of the caudate nucleus in response to anger FEEs
in an fMRI study. This observation supports the notion that the
striatum plays a role in other implicit motives besides nPower.
Interestingly, Hall et al. (2010) also report a negative associa-
tion between nAffiliation and caudate activation in response to
angry faces. This suggests that this motive, too, can influence
striatal processing of motivational incentives, but perhaps in a
different manner than nPower or nAchievement, which were
both associated with increased caudate activation in response to
anger FEEs (see also Schultheiss et al., 2008b). However, this dif-
ference may be due to the fundamentally different meaning of
perceived anger expressions as rewards or punishments in the
context of power, achievement, or affiliation (see Stanton et al.,
2010). Further research is necessary to determine whether nAf-
filiation, in interaction with positive affiliation-related incentives
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(e.g., smiling expressions), can also predict increases in anterior
striatal activation. Although some evidence already suggests that
nAchievement and nAffiliation predict implicit learning that is
followed by motive-specific incentives (Schultheiss et al., 2005a;
Pang, 2010), more research is also needed to clearly demonstrate
when and how these motivational needs influence the implicit
acquisition of instrumental behavior. Such evidence would make
it appear even likelier that these motives recruit the type of action-
outcome-contingency learning associated with the dorsoanterior
striatum that we have postulated here.
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